The recent Divisional Court decisions in 2701836 Ontario Inc. v. Haldimand County (2026), Ho v. Ottawa (2025) and Loeb v. Toronto (2024) provide important clarification on the standard of review, the adequacy of reasons, and the standing of interested parties and landowners to challenge Committee of Adjustment decisions.
This trilogy of Divisional Court decisions follows the enactment of the More Homes Built Faster Act, 2022 by the Ontario legislature in November 2022, which amended the Planning Act to remove the statutory right of third parties, including neighbouring property owners, to appeal a minor variance decision by a Committee of Adjustment.
In Haldimand County, the Court reaffirmed that the applicable standard of review on judicial review of a Committee of Adjustment decision is reasonableness, while emphasizing that no deference is owed on issues of procedural fairness. This distinction is critical, as it reinforces that while substantive planning decisions are reviewed with deference, the fairness of the process remains subject to the Court’s scrutiny despite legislative changes to remove third-party appeals.
The importance of adequate reasons in minor variance decisions
The Court underscored that a Committee of Adjustment is required to consider and satisfy each element of the statutory four-part test for a minor variance, namely: (a) whether the variance is minor; (b) whether it is desirable for the appropriate development or use of the land; (c) whether it maintains the general intent and purpose of the zoning by-law; and (d) whether it maintains the general intent and purpose of the official plan. Each of these elements must be addressed in the Committee’s reasons. The Committee must produce a record that allows a reviewing court to understand why the decision was reached or it risks judicial reconsideration of the decision.
In Haldimand County, the decision failed this standard. The notice of decision did not identify which of the four criteria were applied, and there was a complete absence of explanation tying the outcome of the Committee’s decision to the statutory test. The Court found there was no way to determine what test, if any, the Committee applied, and that neither the minutes from the committee nor the staff report could cure this defect. As a result, the decision was found to be unreasonable and was remitted back to the Committee for reconsideration, rather than substituted by the Court.
By contrast, in Ho v. Ottawa, the Court upheld the Committee’s decision, finding that it “provided public accountability” and sufficient reasons to permit effective appellate review. The Court confirmed that, in this context, reasons need not be extensive, but they must demonstrate that the statutory test was considered and that the decision-making process can be understood. The applicant in Ho was also found to have been afforded the required level of procedural fairness, which is relatively low in minor variance matters.
Standing after the elimination of third-party appeal rights
Importantly, Ho also highlights the limits on standing following the legislative changes to the Planning Act. The Court held that the applicant, as a neighbouring landowner, did not have private interest standing because there was no meaningful impact on his property. The Court rejected the applicant’s attempts to frame the case as involving broader public interest concerns, finding that the interests asserted by the applicant related squarely to the use and enjoyment of his own property. The decision reflects the legislative intent that, with the removal of third-party appeal rights, not all neighbours will be able to challenge Committee decisions through judicial review. A valid application requires a demonstrable and direct interest, not a generalized concern. As the Court explained, third parties cannot “essentially come through the back door where the front door has been barred because [they have] no [statutory] right of appeal.”
Similarly, in Loeb v. Toronto, the Court noted the legislative elimination of third-party appeal rights for minor variances, and emphasized that neighbouring landowners cannot rely on generalized concerns about neighbourhood character to establish standing. The Court made clear that interests relating to the enjoyment of one’s property are private in nature, not public rights, particularly in dense urban environments such as Toronto where expectations of privacy and view protection are limited. The Court further noted the inconsistency that would arise if parties barred from appealing under the Planning Act could nevertheless obtain review through judicial review, reinforcing a cautious approach to granting standing.
Key takeaways
Taken together, these decisions provide clear guidance for municipalities and applicants on the scope and limits of appeals of Committee of Adjustment decisions. Committees of Adjustment must ensure that their decisions explicitly or implicitly demonstrate compliance with the Planning Act’s statutory four-part minor variance test and provide a basis for a reviewing court to understand the reasoning. While reasons may be brief, they cannot be conclusory or disconnected from the statutory criteria. At the same time, potential challengers must recognize that private interest alone is often insufficient to ground judicial review, and that standing will depend on a direct and tangible impact, as seen in Haldimand, where the applicant was an immediately adjacent landowner whose development rights were directly affected.
For more information, please contact the authors, Oliver Flis and Doug Pateman.
