Previously published in LexisNexis Canada’s Municipal Liability Risk Management, Vol. 27, No. 4
Are the where and when of municipal election signs Charter-protected expression? More importantly, can a municipality justify Charter infringement by throwing up its hands and saying that the next town over does the same thing? These were questions recently considered by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
In July 2025, the court issued a decision in Charles Frederick Armstrong v. The Township of Russell, a case about whether a municipal by-law regulating election signs violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[1] The court ruled in favor of Mr. Armstrong, finding that several provisions of the Township’s sign by-law were unconstitutional. In doing so, it rejected the Township’s argument that the restrictions imposed by the subject provisions were minimally impairing because they fell within the range of what is done in other municipalities.
The Armstrong decision is a strong statement from the court that municipalities are obligated to conduct their own search for minimally impairing solutions where they perceive a need to impinge on Charter rights.
Election drama in Russell
Mr. Armstrong won a seat on the Township’s council in a 2024 by-election. During his campaign, he put up 14 election signs between August 2 and August 8, 2024 — roughly three to four weeks before the by-law allowed him to do so. The by-law restricted candidates from posting municipal election signs until 30 days before voting day, despite the election campaign period under the Municipal Elections Act, 1996 commencing prior to this, upon filing of a candidate’s nomination papers. After a sitting councillor complained, the Township warned Mr. Armstrong to take the signs down. When he refused, the Township removed nine of his signs and charged him with nine offenses under the by-law. Mr. Armstrong was required to pay CA$450 in fees under the by-law to get his signs back.
Mr. Armstrong challenged several provisions of the by-law, arguing they violated his constitutional right to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. These provisions included rules about when municipal election signs could go up, bans on signs during certain by-election periods, prohibitions on placing signs on public property and restrictions on where signs could be placed near roads and parks.
The Superior Court weighs in
The court agreed with Mr. Armstrong. Justice Flaherty found that election signs are a form of political expression protected by the Charter, and that – unlike restrictions on litter, which are intended to prevent physical nuisance – restrictions on election signs are tied to the content and purpose of the expression. Similarly, the court found that public property and intersections have been used to express a variety of messages, including campaign signs. The challenged provisions thus fell under the protection of section 2(b).
The court then considered whether the limit on free expression could be justified in a free and democratic society, under section 1 of the Charter. While both sides agreed the by-law had legitimate goals, such as public safety and aesthetics, the court found that the Township failed to show that its restrictions were the least intrusive way to achieve those goals. Notably, the Township offered no evidence explaining why election signs needed stricter rules than real estate signs or community event signs. The court also emphasized that the restrictions on the placement and timing of election signs harms not only candidates but also voters, who are prevented from publicly displaying their political views on their own property during a campaign. Ultimately, the Township was unable to justify the infringement, and the impugned provisions were held to be unconstitutional.
Moreover, the court found that the Township was unjustly enriched by the CA$450 it charged Mr. Armstrong to retrieve his signs, because those fees were collected under an unconstitutional by-law. The court declared the challenged provisions of the by-law invalid and awarded Mr. Armstrong CA$450 in damages.
“Everybody else is doing it” doesn’t cut it
The Armstrong decision is the latest installment in a series of jurisprudence concerning expression during election periods. The court’s reasons emphasize the critical importance of political expression. However, the decision also provides a key lesson to municipalities: the courts take a dim view to municipalities simply following the actions of their peers when it comes to infringing Charter rights.
At the justification stage, the Township argued that its 30-day window in which election signs could be posted was “within the range of what is done in other municipalities and, therefore, within the range of reasonable alternatives.”[2]
The court was unambiguous in its rejection of this argument, writing “the Township’s review of what is done in other municipalities was not a search for a minimally impairing solution.” This argument, which the court paraphrased as “we are doing what everyone else is doing,” was not sufficient. The court observed that there was no evidence of what those other municipalities did to ensure that their by-laws were minimally impairing and that the constitutionality of those by-laws were not at issue. The message for municipalities seeking to curtail expression or any other Charter right: you “must present evidence of a search for a minimally impairing solution.”[3]
This message was promptly picked up in another decision of the Superior Court: Ruck v. City of Mississauga.[4] Wolf Ruck had challenged sections of a City by-law that prohibited property owners from growing grass over 20 centimeters high and having certain nuisance weeds, on the basis that they infringed his right to freedom of expression, among other grounds. The City conceded that Mr. Ruck’s naturalized gardening conveyed expressive content about ecological conservation, and that the impugned provisions infringed Mr. Ruck’s right to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. On the section 1 justification, the City pointed to the fact that it had undertaken a review of the analogous by-laws of other municipalities to demonstrate minimal impairment. In rejecting the City’s argument, Justice Doi followed Armstrong, noting that the constitutionality of the by-laws of other municipalities were not at issue, and writing that “the City, like the Township in Armstrong, led no evidence that it, or any of the other municipalities it canvassed, searched for and selected standards that fell within a range of reasonably minimally impairing solutions to achieve its pressing and substantial objectives.”[5]
Armstrong made clear to municipalities that, when considering the prospect of infringing a Charter-protected right, create, don’t imitate. The responsibility to search for a minimally impairing solution falls on the municipality considering infringement.
For more information on this topic, please reach out to Roberto Aburto, Alice Mihailescu and Conor McCarthy.
